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Separation of Powers in Brazil
Keith S. Rosenn*
At a formal level, all Brazilian constitutions have adhered to the
principle of separation of powers. Moreover, since 1891, Brazilian
constitutions have established a federal system, dividing power
among the federal government, the states, and the municipios
(perhaps best translated as counties). Even at the formal level,
however, the Brazilian version of the principle of separation of
powers has often blurred the classical tripartite division of powers.
Brazil has not only granted substantial legislative powers to the
executive, but, during certain periods, has also created a fourth
power. Moreover, during substantial periods of Brazilian consti-
tutional history, the branches of the government have been nei-
ther separate nor equal. During the many years Brazil was under
military rule, virtually all governmental powers were concen-
trated in the federal executive. In 1988, following 25 years of mili-
tary government, Brazil adopted its current democratic constitu-
tion with a more Montesquieu-like separation of powers, real fed-
eralism, and a well-developed system of checks and balances.
Nevertheless, the historical tendencies towards executive domina-
tion, executive legislation, and a fourth power persist.
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I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
Brazil's approach to separation of powers began quite differently
from the other Latin American republics. In November 1807, as
Napoleon was about to invade Portugal, the Portuguese monarchy
fled to Brazil, eventually establishing the Joint Kingdom of Portu-
gal and Brazil.' In 1821, the Portuguese monarch was forced to
return to Portugal, but he left behind his son, Pedro, as Prince
Regent. In 1822, Dom Pedro declared Brazilian independence and
personally presided over a commission that drafted Brazil's first
constitution, which established a monarchy rather than a republi-
can form of government.
A. The Constitution of 1824
Brazil's first constitution, which has also been its most endur-
ing, entered into force in 1824. Modeled upon the French Consti-
tution of 1814, Brazil's 1824 Constitution established a hereditary
monarchy with Dom Pedro as its Emperor. Although the nation
was divided administratively into provinces and counties, these
governmental units had virtually no independent authority. This
constitution established a unitary form of government in which
practically all authority was concentrated in the central govern-
ment. The approach to separation of powers was unusual. The
central government was divided into four powers: executive, judi-
cial, legislative, and the moderating power.
The executive power was exercised by the Emperor and the min-
isters that the Emperor had appointed. Executive powers in-
cluded: (1) ceremonial functions; (2) appointment of judges, bish-
ops, military heads, and governmental officials; (3) foreign rela-
tions power; (4) provision of external and internal security; (5)
execution of the laws; (6) issuance of decrees and resolutions; (7)
expenditure of funds appropriated by the General Assembly; and
(8) approval or vetoing ecclesiastical decrees. 2
Based upon Benjamin Constant's pouvoir royal, the moderating
power was exercised solely by the Emperor. It was designed to
1. LAURENTINO GOMES, 1808 COMO UMA RAINHA LOUCA, UM PRINCIPE MEDROSO E UMA
CORTE CORRUPTA ENGANARAM NAPOLEAO E MUDARAM A HIST6RIA DE PORTUGAL E DO
BRASIL [1808: HOW A MAD QUEEN, A FEARFUL PRINCE, AND A CORRUPT COURT DECEIVED
NAPOLEON AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL FOREVER] 67-68 (2007).
2. CONST. of 1824 arts. 102-04.
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resolve conflicts among the other powers of government, but no
clear conceptual division between the executive and the moderat-
ing power existed. The Emperor used the moderating power to:
(1) select senators, (2) call extraordinary legislative sessions, (3)
approve or veto legislative measures, (4) nominate presidents of
the provinces, (5) approve or suspend provincial legislative meas-
ures, (6) dissolve the lower chamber of Parliament and call new
elections, (7) nominate and dismiss ministers of State, (8) suspend
judges, and (9) grant pardons and amnesties. 3
The legislative power was exercised in parliamentary fashion.
Members of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house, had four-
year terms, while the members of the Senate, the upper house,
enjoyed life terms. Both houses were selected indirectly by pro-
vincial electors chosen by parish assemblies. These assemblies
were in turn chosen by adult, male citizens who met the minimum
income requirements. 4 The Emperor selected the senators from
lists of three submitted to him by the provincial electors. 5 The
Parliament not only had the power to enact legislation, but it was
also granted the power to interpret the laws. 6 If the royal family
became extinct, Parliament could choose a new dynasty, and it
could choose a regent if the Emperor were a minor. The deputies
could bring impeachment charges against ministers and other
government officials, but not against the Emperor, whom the Con-
stitution placed above the law. 7 Impeachment charges were tried
by the Senate.8
The judiciary was headed by a Supreme Court, which had appel-
late jurisdiction and the power to decide jurisdictional conflicts.
The Supreme Court lacked the power to declare laws unconstitu-
tional, however. 9 Below the Supreme Court was a group of profes-
sional judges. Lay jurors sat in both criminal and civil cases. As
in common law systems, the judges applied the law and the jurors
found the facts. The Emperor could suspend judges against whom
complaints were lodged. The judges had life tenure, however, and
could be removed only if convicted by a tribunal after formal
charges were brought.10
3. Id. arts. 98-101.
4. Id. arts. 92-94.
5. Id. art. 43.
6. Id. art l5 (VII).
7. Id. arts. 38 & 99.
8. Id. art. 47.
9. Id. arts. 163-64.
10. Id. arts. 151-55.
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B. The Constitution of 1891
In 1889, a military revolt overthrew the monarchy. Two years
later, Brazil's first Republican Constitution was promulgated.
The 1891 Constitution was modeled after the U.S. Constitution,
replacing the unitary state with a federal system and the Emperor
with a popularly-elected president, who served for a nonrenewable
four-year term. Each of the twenty states that comprised Brazil
elected its own governor and legislature and organized its own
court system.11 Legislative authority was apportioned between
the states and the federal government along lines similar to the
U.S. Constitution, with one significant exception: the federal gov-
ernment was granted the specific power to legislate in the areas of
civil, commercial, and criminal law. 12 The states were further di-
vided into counties, which were granted virtual autonomy on sub-
jects of special interest to them.13
The 1891 Constitution explicitly adopted the traditional tripar-
tite division of powers enshrined in the U.S. Constitution along
with a similar set of checks and balances. It specifically provided:
"The organs of national sovereignty are the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Powers, which are independent and harmonious with
each other."1 4 The fourth power, the moderating power, was rele-
gated to the constitutional scrapheap, from which it would peri-
odically resurface in subsequent constitutions. The bicameral leg-
islature, made up of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, was
elected by universal male suffrage. Each state elected three sena-
tors. Deputies were apportioned according to each state's popula-
tion, with each state electing a minimum of four deputies. 15 The
judiciary was headed by a Supreme Court, to which the Constitu-
tion specifically granted the power of judicial review. Following
the United States model, Congress was authorized to establish
inferior federal courts, and judicial independence was guaranteed
by life tenure and a prohibition against diminution of judicial
salaries.1 6 The jury system was also retained.1 7
11. CONST. of 1891 art. 5.
12. Id. art. 34 (23).
13. Id. art. 68.
14. Id. art. 15.
15. Id. arts. 16, 28, & 30.
16. Id. art. 57 (heading & § 1).
17. Id. art. 72, § 31.
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The 1891 Constitution worked poorly. Shortly after its promul-
gation, the first elected president staged an autogolpe,'8 dissolving
Congress and declaring a state of siege. The autogolpe fizzled,
leading to the president's resignation. 19 The period during which
the 1891 Constitution was in force, called the Old Republic, was
characterized by widespread electoral fraud and considerable po-
litical instability. The 1891 Constitution was a casualty of the
1930 military revolt that brought Getdilio Vargas to power. Var-
gas, who had been governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul,
claimed that he had been deprived of a victory in the 1930 presi-
dential election by fraud. With the aid of the military, Vargas
overthrew the government and became the provisional president.20
From 1930 to 1934, Congress did not function, and Vargas gov-
erned by decree.
C. The Constitution of 1934
Not until 1934, when Vargas was elected president, did Brazil
return to a constitutional government. A constituent assembly
adopted a new constitution modeled upon the Weimar Constitu-
tion of 1919 and the Spanish Constitution of 1931. Even though
the 1934 Constitution formally retained the tripartite separation
of powers of the prior constitution, legislative power was actually
exercised only by the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies. 21
The Senate assumed the role of a fourth power, the moderating
power, coordinating the exercise of the other powers and watching
over the Constitution.22 Consistent with this recreation of the
moderating power, the 1934 Constitution also instituted an impor-
tant innovation to the separation of powers and judicial review.
It conferred upon the Federal Senate the power to suspend the
execution, in whole or in part, of any law or act-be it federal,
state, or municipal-declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.23 Whenever the case law of the Supreme Court definitively
determines the unconstitutionality of a law or act, the President of
the Supreme Court sends a formal notification to the Senate re-
questing suspension of the offending norm. While the Senate is
not obligated to suspend the offending provision, in practice the
18. An autogolpe is a coup d'etat staged by the head of state himself.
19. E. BRADFORD BURNS, A HISTORY OF BRAZIL 209-10 (1970).
20. Id. at 290.
21. CONST. of 1934 arts. 22 & 39.
22. Id. art. 88.
23. Id. arts. 91 (IV) & 96.
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Senate usually does so. The Senate adopts a resolution that effec-
tively converts a Supreme Court determination of unconstitution-
ality with only inter partes effects into a decision with erga omnes
effects.24 Once it has suspended a norm, the Senate cannot revive
it.25 While this Constitution lasted only three years, the provision
for Senate suspension of norms declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court has continued in subsequent constitutions, includ-
ing the present Constitution.26
D. The Constitution of 1937
In 1937, Getfilio Vargas staged an autogolpe under the pretext
of suppressing a Communist plot to take over Brazil. Vargas re-
placed the 1934 Constitution with a new constitution that enabled
him to dispense with any pretense of separation of powers. The
provisions for democratic institutions were never applied. Vargas
dissolved all political parties and suspended elections. Even the
plebiscite required for the 1937 Constitution to go into effect was
never held.27
President Vargas was the supreme authority of the federal gov-
ernment. In theory, federal legislative power was to be exercised
by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Vargas, however,
closed Congress and ruled by decree. Theoretically, an absolute
majority of the Supreme Court or lower tribunals had the power to
declare legislation unconstitutional. Vargas could overturn judi-
cial declarations of unconstitutionality, however, by resubmitting
the law declared unconstitutional to Congress, which by a two-
thirds vote of each house could overrule the judicial decision. 28
Since Congress never met, the Vargas dictatorship governed with-
out any real hindrance from the courts, ignoring even decisions of
the Supreme Court.29 From 1937 to 1945, Vargas governed under
a state of emergency, pursuant to which he suspended individual
rights and guarantees and issued more than 8,000 decree-laws,
24. Gilmar Mendes, 0 Papel do Senado Federal no Controle Federal de
Constitucionalidade: um Caso Cldssico de Mutagdo Constitucional [The Role of the Senate
in the Federal Control of Constitutionality: A Classic Example of Constitutional Mutation],
45 REV. INFORM. LEGIS. 257 (No. 179, July/Sept. 2008).
25. RMS 16.512, 38 RTJ 5 (STF en banc 1966), trans. in KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S.
ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASEBOOK 119-24 (1975).
26. CONST. of 1988 art. 52 (X).
27. BURNS, supra note 19, at 296-97.
28. CONST. of 1937 art. 96, sole paragraph.
29. GILMAR FERREIRA MENDES ET AL., CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL [COURSE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 170 (2d ed. 2008).
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some of which are still in force today. There was no real separa-
tion of powers under the 1937 Constitution, and the autonomy of
state and county governments was severely curtailed.
E. The Constitution of 1946
In 1945, the military overthrew the Vargas dictatorship. The
following year, Brazil adopted its fifth constitution, which re-
flected the influence of the U.S. Constitution, particularly with
respect to federalism, as well as the influence of the Weimar Con-
stitution in its provisions on socio-economic rights. The 1946 Con-
stitution restored the traditional tripartite separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances that had been adopted in
the 1891 Constitution, as well as the state and local autonomy
within their respective spheres.
As a reaction to the excesses of the Vargas era, the president,
elected by direct popular vote for a five-year term, was deprived of
the power to issue decree-laws. 30 The 1946 Constitution gave the
bicameral legislature a monopoly on law making. In practice,
however, the legislature seldom exercised this power. Congress
even failed to enact a substantial amount of the legislation specifi-
cally contemplated by the Constitution. This led the executive to
issue a plethora of administrative decrees as a substitute for the
lack of legislation.
The judiciary recovered its autonomy, as well as the power of
judicial review. Judges were guaranteed life tenure, non-
transferability, and non-diminution of their salaries. 31 Claims of
injuries to individual rights were constitutionally protected from
being excluded from the jurisdiction of the judiciary.32
The 1946 Constitution began to unravel in 1961, when Presi-
dent Jinio Quadros enigmatically resigned, allegedly because the
country was ungovernable unless under a regime of emergency
powers. 33 Widespread opposition to his populist successor, Vice
President Joao Goulart, resulted in the adoption of a constitu-
tional amendment that allowed Goulart to assume the presidency
only under a parliamentary regime that deprived the presidency
of most of its powers. 34 The parliamentary regime functioned so
30. CONST. of 1946 art. 87 (1).
31. Id. art. 95 (I-II).
32. Id. art. 141 (§ 4).
33. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930-1964: AN EXPERIMENT IN
DEMOCRACY 205 (1967).
34. CONST. AMEND. No. 4 of Sept. 2, 1961.
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badly that sixteen months later Brazil adopted another constitu-
tional amendment to restore the presidential system.35
Goulart's attempt to move Brazil sharply left and his regime's
inability to contain spiraling inflation resulted in a military take-
over in 1964.36 While the 1946 Constitution theoretically re-
mained in force, the military modified key provisions by a series of
institutional acts through which the military high command func-
tioned as a self-proclaimed ambulatory constituent assembly.
These institutional acts enabled the military to designate a new
president, to purge the Congress of opposition members, and to
deprive many opposition figures of their political and civil rights
for ten years. One of these acts permitted the military president
to pack the Supreme Court,37 while another institutional act re-
duced the size of the Supreme Court, permitting the president to
remove inconveniently independent judges. 38 One institutional
act authorized the president to issue decree-laws in matters of
national security, as well as to decree the recess of the national,
state, and county legislative bodies, authorizing him to issue de-
cree-laws during such recess. 39 Another act authorized the presi-
dent to issue decrees in matters involving national security and all
financial and administrative matters. 40 The institutional acts rou-
tinely contained a clause precluding judicial review of any acts
issued pursuant to such acts.41 While the tripartite separation of
powers was formally maintained, executive and legislative powers
were largely concentrated in the military high command, and the
independence of the judiciary was severely undermined.
Paradoxically, in the midst of these institutional acts, Congress
amended the Constitution to strengthen the Supreme Court by
creating an original direct action of unconstitutionality called the
"representation."42  The representation enabled the Supreme
Court to determine the constitutionality of any law or normative
decree on its face, and the effects of its decision were binding erga
omnes ("toward all"). Significantly, however, the only person with
standing to bring a representation was the procurator general,
who was appointed by and served at the pleasure of the president.
35. CONST. AMEND. No. 6 of Jan. 23, 1963.
36. See SKIDMORE, supra note 33, at 294-302.
37. Institutional Act No. 2 of Oct. 27, 1965, art. 6.
38. Institutional Act No. 6 of Feb. 1, 1969, art. 1.
39. Institutional Act No. 2 of Oct. 27, 1965, arts. 30 & 31.
40. Institutional Act No. 4 of Dec. 7, 1966, art. 9.
41. Institutional Act No. 6 of Feb. 1, 1969, art. 4.
42. CONST. AMEND. No. 16 of Nov. 26, 1965, art. 2.
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F. The Constitution of 1967
The purpose of the 1967 Constitution was to confer a semblance
of legitimacy and permanence to the military regimes running
Brazil since April 1964. This Constitution was drafted for the
military and ratified by a Congress that had been purged of sig-
nificant political opposition. Incorporating key provisions of four
institutional acts promulgated in the 1964-1966 period, the 1967
Constitution formally declared that the three branches of the gov-
ernment were independent and harmonious, and prohibited any
branch from delegating any of its powers to another branch. In
practice, the approach to separation of powers harked back to the
1937 Constitution, which institutionalized the Vargas dictator-
ship.
In theory, the president was elected for a four-year term by an
electoral college made up of members of the purged Congress and
delegates nominated by the state legislatures. 43 In practice, how-
ever, only a general could be a candidate, and the only votes that
counted were those of other generals. 44 The 1967 Constitution
conferred not only executive powers but also legislative powers on
the president, who was authorized to legislate by decree in mat-
ters of national security and finance, even when the legislature
was in session. 45 Congress could either approve or reject a decree-
law, but if Congress failed to act within 60 days the decree-law
was deemed to be approved.46
The Congress was made up of a Chamber of Deputies, popularly
elected for a four-year term, and a Senate, popularly elected for an
eight-year term. Each state elected three senators, but represen-
tation in the lower house was apportioned by population, with
each state having a minimum of seven deputies and each territory
one deputy. 47
The judiciary was guaranteed life tenure, non-transferability,
and non-diminution of salaries. 48 In practice, however, judicial
independence was compromised by jurisdictional limitations and
by the diversion of critical cases to military tribunals.49 Constitu-
43. CONST. of 1967 art. 76.
44. Henry J. Steiner & David M. Trubek, Brazil-All Power to the Generals, 49
FOREIGN AFF. 464, 465 (1971).
45. CONST. of 1967 art. 58.
46. Id. art. 58, sole paragraph.
47. Id. arts. 41 & 43 (§ 1).
48. Id. art. 108 (I-II).
49. KARST & ROSENN, supra note 25, at 214-15.
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tionally guaranteed individual rights were seldom enforced by the
courts.
After promulgation of the 1967 Constitution, Brazil entered into
a period of constant crisis due to widespread opposition to the
military government. The military responded by issuing another
twelve institutional acts that continuously modified the new con-
stitution. The most notorious was Institutional Act No. 5 of De-
cember 13, 1968, which totally eviscerated the principle of separa-
tion of powers and conferred dictatorial powers upon the presi-
dent. This Act authorized the president to suspend all legislative
bodies and to exercise all legislative powers by himself. It also
authorized the president to suspend the political rights of any citi-
zen for ten years, to quash any legislative mandate summarily, to
declare or prolong a state of siege, to suspend freedom of associa-
tion, to impose censorship, and to fire summarily any governmen-
tal officeholder or employee despite any constitutional guarantee
of tenure. 50 In addition, it suspended habeas corpus for crimes
against national security, the popular economy, and socio-
economic order.51 Institutional Act No. 5 resulted in a witch-hunt
that decimated the legislative and judicial branches.
In August 1969, President Costa e Silva suffered an incapacitat-
ing stroke. Rather than permit the civilian vice-president to suc-
ceed to the presidency, the military high command issued an insti-
tutional act authorizing the military leaders to govern as a junta.52
In 1969, with the Congress in recess, the junta utilized its decree-
law power to issue Constitutional Amendment No. 1. This so-
called amendment actually rewrote and renumbered the entire
1967 Constitution.
G. The Constitution of 1969
The 1969 Constitution 53 repeated its predecessor's language on
the separation of powers and the prohibition against delegation to
any other branch. In practice, however, it concentrated govern-
mental power in the executive. The president's power to issue de-
cree-laws was expanded to include taxation, creation of public em-
50. Institutional Act No. 5 of Dec. 13, 1968, arts. 4, 7, & 6 (§ 1).
51. Id. art. 10.
52. Institutional Act No. 12 of Apr. 3, 1965.
53. It is a matter of debate as to whether Constitutional Amendment No. 1 of 1969 is a
new constitution or an amendment. Since it rewrote and renumbered the entire prior con-
stitution, I prefer to treat it as a new constitution.
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ployment, and determination of the salaries of civil servants. 54
More importantly, however, Article 51 authorized the president to
send bills to Congress on any subject. Each house had only 45
days in which to consider such bills, unless the president labeled
the bill urgent. Both houses had only 40 days for joint considera-
tion of any urgent bill. Any bill that was not considered during
these allotted periods was deemed to have been automatically ap-
proved by Congress. 55
Individual rights remained suspended until October 13, 1978,
when Institutional Act No. 5 was finally repealed.56 Both the 1967
and 1969 Constitutions, like the 1937 Constitution, were designed
to cloak de facto military regimes in the verbal cellophane of con-
stitutionalism. All three constitutions heavily centralized power
in the Executive and badly distorted separation of powers. Each
transferred large amounts of power to the federal government
from the states and local governments, and from the legislature
and judiciary to the executive. None provided any serious protec-
tion for individual rights. None should be regarded as legitimate,
as they were never adopted by the people or a truly representative
Congress, and the regimes they institutionalized had no serious
commitment to constitutionalism.
II. THE 1988 CONSTITUTION
In 1985, following more than two decades of military rule, Bra-
zil's Electoral College finally elected a civilian president. 57 Al-
though most of the authoritarian features of the 1969 Constitution
had been relaxed by subsequent amendments, the new civilian
leadership resolved to adopt a constitutional amendment empow-
ering the next Congress to serve as a constituent assembly.58 Be-
cause President Sarney refused to submit to the assembly a draft
constitution prepared by a group of experts that he himself had
appointed, the basic drafting was done by all 559 members of
Congress, who divided themselves into eight committees. The re-
sult was a lengthy, detailed, and convoluted document that was
54. CONST. of 1969 art. 55. Even if Congress rejected the decree-law within the allotted
60-day period, any act taken on the basis of the disapproved decree-law was deemed valid.
Id. art. 55 § 2.
55. Id. art. 51 (§§ 2 & 3).
56. CONST. AMEND. NO. 11 of Oct. 13, 1978.
57. Tancredo Neves, head of the Partido do Movimento Democrdtico Brasileiro (PMDB),
the principal opposition party, was selected by the Electoral College but died before his
inauguration. Jos6 Sarney, the Vice President, was sworn in Neves's place.
58. CONST. AMEND. No. 26 of Nov. 27, 1985.
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finally promulgated on October 5, 1988. Its text contains a great
many specific rules that one would expect to find in statutes or
regulations rather than in a constitution. 59 Not surprisingly, this
Constitution has already been amended 63 times. 60
The 1988 Constitution was designed to weaken the executive
and to strengthen the legislature and judiciary. Indeed, initial
drafts adopted a parliamentary rather than a presidential system
of government. The present Constitution makes the president
accountable to Congress, which can, and actually did, impeach
Fernando Collor de Mello, the first president elected pursuant to
its provisions.61 Either house of Congress, or one of its commit-
tees, can require any executive minister to appear personally to
testify or answer written interrogatories. Failure to comply with-
out good cause constitutes grounds for impeachment. 62 Congress
also has exclusive power to accept or reject any international
agreement that has serious financial consequences. 63
The principle of the separation of powers is explicitly enshrined
in Article 2 of the 1988 Constitution, which provides: "The Powers
of the Union are the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, which
are independent and harmonious with each other." Moreover, the
principle of separation of powers is embedded in constitutional
concrete; it is one of the permanent provisions that cannot be
changed, even by constitutional amendment. 64
Brazil has a federal system of government in which governmen-
tal powers are explicitly divided, vertically, among three levels:
the Union or federal government, the states and territories, and
the counties. In 12 areas, the federal government, states, Federal
District, and counties have joint powers, and, in 16 areas, they
have concurrent legislative powers.65 In the area of concurrent
authority, the federal government's powers are limited to estab-
lishing general rules. If there is no federal legislation in a concur-
59. See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitu-
tionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773-802 (1990).
60. The author's annotated English translation of this Constitution along with 62 of the
63 amendments can be found in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1-335
(Release 2008-4, Ocean Pub., Rudiger Wolfrum ed., May 2008).
61. The history of the impeachment is told in Thomas Skidmore, Collor's Downfall in
Historical Perspective, in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL REFORM IN BRAZIL: THE IMPACT OF
COLLOR'S IMPEACHMENT 1-18 (Keith S. Rosenn & Richard Downes eds., 1999). For a legal
and constitutional perspective, see Fdbio Konder Comparato, The Impeachment Process and
the Constitutional Significance of the Collor Affair, in id. at 73-85.
62. CONST. of 1988 art. 50 (caput & § 2).
63. Id. art. 49 (1).
64. Id. art. 60, § 4 (III).
65. Id. arts. 23 & 24.
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rent area, the states may freely regulate. If, however, there is
federal legislation, the states may adopt only supplemental
rules.6 6 A residual clause reserves to the states the powers not
forbidden to them by the Constitution. 67 The more than 500 coun-
ties are assured political, legislative, administrative, and financial
autonomy. They can also legislate on subjects of local interest and
to supplement federal and state legislation.
68
The powers of the federal government are also explicitly divided
horizontally among three branches or powers: the executive, legis-
lative, and judicial. Like the United States, Brazil has a system of
checks and balances, which produces a number of overlaps among
these three powers.
The 1988 Constitution also establishes a quasi-fourth power,
which in some ways resembles the moderating power, in the form
of the Public Ministry. This institution existed in prior constitu-
tions, but it was granted autonomy from the executive in the 1988
Constitution. The Public Ministry is headed by the Procurator
General of the Republic, who is appointed by the president with
approval of the Senate. The Procurator General may be dismissed
by presidential initiative only if an absolute majority of the Senate
votes for dismissal. 69 The Public Ministry has both financial and
administrative autonomy, and its employees are career civil ser-
vants.70 Not only does the Public Ministry prosecute all criminal
offenses, but it also has responsibility for "defending the legal or-
der, the democratic regime, and indispensable social and individ-
ual interests. 71 The 1988 Constitution greatly expands the Public
Ministry's latter role by creating a large number of individual,
collective, and social rights, along with a substantial number of
public actions that can be brought in the courts to enforce these
expansive rights. The Public Ministry has been playing a major
role in the "judicialization of politics" 72 by bringing numerous civil
66. Id. art. 24 (§§ 1-3).
67. Id. art. 25 (§ 1).
68. Id. art. 30 (1-1I).
69. Id. art. 128 § 2.
70. Id. art. 127 (§§ 1 & 2).
71. Id. art. 127.
72. The extensive literature on "judicialization of politics" in Brazil includes LUIZ
WERNECK ET AL., A JUDICIALIZAQAO DA POLITICA E DAS RELAQOES SOCLAIS NO BRASIL [THE
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN BRAZIL] (1999); Manoel Gongalves
Ferreira Filho, Poder Judicidrio na Constituigdo de 1988: Judicializatdo da Politica e
Politiza~do da Justiga [The Judicial Power and the Constitution of 1988: The
Judicialization of Politics and the Politicizing of Justice], 198 RDA 1 (Oct./Dec. 1994);
Marcos Faro de Castro, 0 Supremo Tribunal Federal e a Judicializagdo da Politica [The
Supreme Federal Court and the Judicialization of Politics], 12 REV. BRAS. CIENCIAS SOC.
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actions to defend the environment, to protect consumers, to defend
the interests of children and other disadvantaged groups, and to
try to prevent abuse of administrative powers. 73 The Procurator
General sits with the Supreme Court and has responsibility for
rendering advisory opinions on cases under consideration, but
does not have a vote.
The executive is headed by a president who is directly elected by
a majority of the people. 74 The President of Brazil performs much
the same basic functions as the President of the United States.
He is the chief executive officer with responsibility for seeing that
the laws are faithfully executed, but the power to enforce federal
criminal laws is entrusted to the autonomous Public Ministry. He
has primary responsibility for conducting foreign relations and
entering into treaties and international conventions. He has the
power to appoint (with the approval of an absolute majority of the
Federal Senate) members of the highest federal courts and the
chief executive officers. 75 He has the power to veto legislation,
including the power to make line item vetoes. He is the com-
mander-in-chief of the armed forces. He has the powers to pardon
and commute sentences. 76
147-156 (1997); Ernani Rodrigues de Carvalho, Em Busca da Judicializagdo da Politica no
Brasil: Apontamentos para uma Nova Abordagem [In Search of the Judicialization of
Politics in Brazil: Notes for a New Approach], 23 REV. SOCIOL. POLIT. 115-26 (2004);
Amandino Teixeira Nunes Junior, A Constituiqdo de 1988 e a Judicializado da Politica no
Brasil [The Constitution of 1988 and the Judicialization of Politics in Brazil], 45 REV.
INFORM. LEG. 157 (No. 178, Apr./June 2008); Rog6rio Bastos Arantes, Constitutionalism,
the Expansion of Justice and the Judicialization of Politics in Brazil, in THE
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 231-262 (Rachel Sieder et al., eds., 2005).
73. See Rosangela Batista Calvancanti, The Effectiveness of Law: Civil Society and the
Public Prosecution in Brazil, in ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW: SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE NEW LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES 34, 38-49 (Enrique Peruzzotti & Catalina Smu-
lovitz eds., 2006).
74. The Electoral College instituted by the military constitutions was eliminated in the
1988 Constitution.
75. CONST. of 1988 arts. 101 (sole paragraph), 104 (sole paragraph), & 84 (I). The
president's power to appoint members of the Superior Tribunal of Justice is restricted by
the constitutional requirement that one-third must be appointed from judges of the Federal
Regional Tribunals and one-third from judges of the State Tribunals of Justice, from a list
of three names prepared by the respective Tribunals; the remaining one-third must be
selected alternately, in equal parts, from lawyers and members of the Public Ministries,
from a list of names prepared by the entities representing the various groups.
76. CONST. of 1988 art. 84. Congress, however, has the power to issue amnesties. Id.
art. 48(VIII).
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A. Checks and Balances
Brazil has never had a rigid doctrine of the separation of pow-
ers. Following the U.S. model, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution,
like its predecessors, contains an intricate system of checks and
balances that results in shared powers. The Chamber of Deputies,
by a two-thirds vote, may check the executive by exercising the
Public Ministry's power to authorize criminal charges against the
president, vice president, and federal ministers.77 By a similar
two-thirds vote, the Chamber of Deputies can also bring im-
peachment charges. If criminally indicted, the president is tried
before the Supreme Federal Tribunal; if impeachment charges are
brought, the Senate exercises the judicial power to try the presi-
dent, with the President of the Supreme Court presiding. In con-
tradistinction from the United States, an indicted president is
suspended from office as soon as the Supreme Court receives the
criminal accusation, while an impeached president is suspended
from office as soon as proceedings are instituted in the Senate.
78
If the impeachable offenses also constitute criminal offenses, an
impeachment trial in the Senate and a criminal prosecution before
the Supreme Court could proceed simultaneously.7 9 In addition to
the president, federal ministers, members of Supreme Court, and
the federal Procurator General are subject to removal from office
by impeachment. Members of the Supreme Court and the Procu-
rator General can be both accused and tried solely by the Senate,
which then exercises both the prosecutorial and judicial powers in
the same proceeding.80 A criminal prosecution of a member of
Congress for a crime committed after investiture can be sus-
pended at any time prior to final judgment by a majority vote of
the respective house. In addition, members of Congress are enti-
tled to be tried before the Supreme Court for crimes committed
after investiture.8'
The president is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces,
but Congress has the exclusive power to authorize the president to
77. Id. art. 51 (1).
78. Id. art. 86 § 1. The presidential suspension ends after 180 days if the trial has not
yet been concluded.
79. Fibio Konder Comparato, The Impeachment Process and the Constitutional Signifi-
cance of the Collor Affair, in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL REFORM IN BRAZIL: THE IMPACT OF
COLLOR'S IMEACHMENT 73, 76 (Keith S. Rosenn & Richard Downes eds., 1998).
80. Law No. 1.079 of Apr. 10, 1950, arts. 41 & 55.
81. CONST. of 1988 art. 53. Members of Congress lose their mandates if their criminal
conviction becomes final or their conduct is declared by their respective house to be incom-
patible with parliamentary decorum. Id. art. 55.
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declare war or to make peace.8 2 Congress also has the exclusive
powers to approve a state of defense or federal intervention, or to
authorize a state of siege, as well as to suspend any of these
measures.8 3 Neither the president nor the vice president may
leave the country for more than fifteen days without Congres-
sional authorization.8 4 The president's power to conclude treaties
is subject to approval by Congress,8 5 and Congress has the exclu-
sive power to decide definitively on international treaties or
agreements that encumber national patrimony.8 6 The president's
appointments power is subject to Senate approval.87 In addition,
Congress has the power to review the annual accounts rendered
by the president, as well as the power to supervise and control
executive acts, including those of the indirect administration.8 8
Congress has the power to legislate, but that power is not exclu-
sive. Considerable legislative power is also specifically granted to
the executive. Brazil's president is granted the legislative power
to veto legislation, a power that also includes a line item veto.8 9
Only an absolute majority vote of both houses of Congress, how-
ever, is needed to override a presidential veto.90 The president has
the power to issue delegated laws and provisional measures that
have the force of law for a limited period.91 Congress can grant
the president the power to issue regulatory decrees, but Congress
can stay any such presidential decree if it deems that the decree
exceeds regulatory authority or the limits of the delegation. 92
Moreover, the president has the constitutional power to issue
normative decrees, without any statutory basis, with respect to
the organization and functioning of the federal administration
whenever this issuance does not result in an increase in expense
82. Id. art. 49 (II).
83. Id. art. 49 (V).
84. Id. art. 49 (III).
85. Id. art. 84 (VIII).
86. Id. art. 49 (I).
87. Id. art. 84 (XIV). In practice, however, the Senate has made little use of this check-
ing power. The Federal Senate has not rejected a single presidential nomination to the
Supreme Court since rejecting five during the presidency of Floriano Peixoto (1891-1894).
See Renato Stanziola Vierira, Ainda 0 Senado Federal, a Nomeagdo de Ministros para o
STF e Seus Mandatos [The Federal Senate: The Nomination of Ministers for the STF and
Its Mandates], 8 REV. DIR. ESTADO 111, 122-23 (2007).
88. Id. art. 49 (IX & X).
89. Id. art. 84 (V).
90. Id. art. 66 (§§ 4 & 5).
91. Id. arts. 62 & 68.
92. Id. art. 49 (V).
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or creation or abolition of public agencies. Presidential decrees
may also abolish unoccupied public positions or offices.9 3
The judiciary checks both the legislature and the executive
through the power of judicial review. The 1988 Constitution pro-
vides explicitly for one of the most comprehensive systems of judi-
cial review in the entire world. Brazil has both a diffuse system in
which all levels of the courts may declare norms unconstitutional
in concrete actions, as well as a centralized system in which only
the Supreme Court has the power to declare norms unconstitu-
tional in the abstract. As Section C below makes clear, in per-
forming judicial review, the Brazilian judiciary exercises not only
judicial power but legislative and executive powers as well.
B. Executive Legislation
The most important power transference in the 1988 Constitu-
tion was an attempt to concentrate virtually all law-making pow-
ers in the Congress. The Constitution deprives the president of
the power to issue decree-laws, the most abused authoritarian
legacy power in the 1937, 1967, and 1969 Constitutions. In addi-
tion, the Constitution seeks to give Congress exclusive power to
control rule-making by administrative agencies. All executive
acts, including those of the indirect administration (i.e., govern-
ment-owned corporations and semi-autonomous agencies) are sub-
ject to either direct control of Congress or the control of a single
house of Congress. 94
Nevertheless, most historical Brazilian legislation has been ini-
tiated by the executive rather than the legislature. This is also
the case under the 1988 Constitution, which even explicitly grants
the president exclusive power to initiate any legislation that deals
with: (1) the size of the armed forces; (2) creation of public offices
and positions or increases in compensation for public administra-
tion; (3) administrative and judicial organization, tax and budget-
ary matters, public services, and administrative personnel in the
Territories; (4) the legal regime, appointment, tenure, and retire-
ment for all federal and territorial civil servants; (5) organization
of the federal, state, and territorial Public Ministries and public
defenders' offices; (6) creation and extinction of ministries and
agencies of public administration; and (7) the legal regime, ap-
pointment, promotions, tenure, reform, and compensation of the
93. Id. art. 84 (VI), as amended by CONsT. AMEND. No. 32 of Sept. 11, 2001, art. 1.
94. Id. art. 49 (X).
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Armed Forces. 95 Moreover, the president must initiate the legisla-
tion establishing multi-year plans, budgetary directives, and the
annual budgets for all branches of the federal government. 96 Con-
gress has to approve the budget, but its power to amend the pro-
posed budget is seriously limited. Any amendments by Congress
to the annual budget bill must be compatible with the president's
multi-year plan as well as the law of budgetary directives, and the
funding for such modifications must stem only from elimination of
expenditures. 97 Congress may not authorize programs that are
not included in the budgetary law, nor may it spend funds that
exceed budgetary authorization. 98 Such provisions grant extraor-
dinary presidential power to control large parts of the legislative
agendas and to prevent passage of legislation to which he is op-
posed.
This extraordinary presidential power to control critical parts of
the legislative agenda and the budgetary process has also resulted
in executive domination of Brazil's so-called independent regula-
tory agencies. Even though these agencies appear to have all the
formal characteristics of independence, in practice, such agencies
are essentially controlled by the executive. 99
While the drafters of the 1988 Constitution sought to avoid the
evils of the decree-law, they nevertheless felt compelled to confer
both emergency and non-emergency legislative powers upon the
president. Hence, Congress authorized the president to issue
delegated laws or provisional measures. According to Article 68,
Congress may delegate to the president the power to enact legisla-
tion, except for a few reserved subjects. More importantly, if he
alleges relevance and urgency, Article 62 authorizes the president
to issue provisional measures with the force of law. While the
delegated law has seen little use,100 all Brazilian presidents have
made extensive use of provisional measures to enact a wide vari-
ety of legislative initiatives.
95. Id. art. 61 (§ 1).
96. Id. art. 165.
97. Id. art. 166 (§ 3).
98. Id. art. 167 (1 & II).
99. Mariana Mota Prado, Towards a Theory of presidential Dominance: An Analysis of
the Relationship between the Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil, 77 REV.
JUR. UPR. 393, 403-09 (2008).
100. Only two delegated laws have been enacted since adoption of the 1988 Constitution:
Delegated Law 12 of Aug. 7, 1992 and Delegated Law No. 13 of Aug. 27, 1992.
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The framers of the Brazilian Constitution borrowed the provi-
sional measure from the Italian Constitution,10' which establishes
a parliamentary system of government. They did so under the
mistaken assumption that Brazil would be adopting a parliamen-
tary system. When the final draft reverted to a presidential sys-
tem, the Constituent Assembly failed to remove the provisional
measure.
From 1988 until 2001, Article 62 of the Brazilian Constitution
conferred authority on the president to issue provisional measures
with the force of law on any subject whenever he deemed a matter
"urgent and relevant," with one exception. That exception was set
out in Article 246 of the Constitution, inserted by amendment in
1995, which prohibited the use of provisional measures to regulate
constitutional amendments. 10 2 The only constraint upon exercise
of the power to issue provisional measures was that the president
had to submit such measures immediately to Congress. If not
converted into law by Congress within 30 days, the provisional
measure was deemed null and void ab initio (from the begin-
ning).10 3 Congress, however, generally failed to act upon provi-
sional measures within thirty days. Partly, this was due to inertia
and a too brief time period, and partly because the president often
maneuvered to prevent a vote when there was substantial opposi-
tion to a measure.
Until 2001, there is little doubt that Brazilian presidents seri-
ously misused the provisional measure in a way that seriously
threatened the separation of powers. Between September 1988
and September 11, 2001, Brazilian presidents issued 619 original
provisional measures and reissued 5,491 provisional measures.
Routinely, provisional measures were reissued, sometimes as
many as 80 or 90 times, until Congress either ratified or rejected
them. In addition, reissued provisional measures routinely con-
tained clauses validating all acts performed in reliance upon them.
Most of these provisional measures involved routine rather than
emergency legislation. Paradoxically, until the adoption of a con-
stitutional amendment in 2001, civilian presidents actually exer-
cised more power to govern by decree under the 1988 Constitution
than the military presidents enjoyed under the prior two authori-
tarian constitutions.
101. ITALIAN CONST. of 1948, art. 77.
102. CONST. AMEND. No. 6 of Aug. 15, 1995, art. 3. The same language was added again
by CONST. AMEND. NO. 7 of Aug. 15, 1995, art. 2.
103. CONST. of 1988 art. 62, § 3.
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The Supreme Court has taken the position that whether a par-
ticular provisional measure is actually "urgent or relevant" is a
non-justiciable political question.10 4 The Supreme Court, however,
reserved the right to review such measures for manifest abuse. 105
Eventually, the Supreme Court began declaring provisional meas-
ures unconstitutional if they obviously lacked relevancy and ur-
gency. 106 The Supreme Court also held that the reissuance of pro-
visional measures did not violate the Constitution unless the pro-
visional measure had been rejected by Congress. 10 7
The abuse of the provisional measure by the executive led to a
serious controversy with Congress that was ultimately resolved in
2001 with the promulgation of Constitutional Amendment No. 32.
This Amendment was aimed at reducing abuse of the provisional
measure and at shifting legislative power away from the execu-
tive. Amendment 32 prohibits Brazilian presidents from issuing
provisional measures on many subjects, such as nationality, citi-
zenship, political parties and political rights, electoral law, crimi-
nal and procedural law, budgets, and constitutional matters re-
quiring complementary legislation. 108 To prevent another Collor
Plan-a hare-brained provisional measure that froze bank depos-
its for 18 months-provisional measures may not be used to detain
or sequester property, savings accounts, or any financial assets.1 09
Provisional measures are now valid for 60 rather than 30 days.
Such measures may be extended only once, for another 60 days, if
Congress has failed to act upon them. A provisional measure that
has been rejected by Congress or has become invalid because of
passage of time may not be reissued in the same legislative ses-
sion. Thus, provisional measures normally have a maximum life
of 120 days. In certain cases, however, their life may be longer
because the time period is tolled when Congress is in recess. A
104. ADI 1.397-DF (STF en banc Apr. 28, 1997) (Rel. Min. Carlos Velloso), 165 RTJ 173
(1998).
105. ADI 162-1-DF-(STF en banc Dec. 14, 1989) (Rel. Min. Moreira Alves), Didrio de
Justiga of Sept. 19, 1997 [Justice Journal of Sept. 19, 1997]; ADI-1.647-PA (STF en banc
Dec. 2, 1998) (Rel. Min. Carlos Velloso), 168 RTJ 774 (1999); MENDES ET AL., supra note 29,
at 885.
106. The Supreme Court found such abuse for the first time in ADI 1.753 (medida caute-
lar) (STF Apr. 16, 1998) (Rel. Min. Sepdlveda Pertence), Didrio de Justiva of June 12, 1998
[Justice Journal of June 12, 1998], where a provisional measure attempted to make it eas-
ier for the government to attempt to open final judgments in expropriation cases.
107. ADI-MC 293 (STF en banc June 6, 1990) (Rel. Min. Celso de Mello), 146 RTJ 707
(1993); ADI 1.397-DF (STF en banc Apr. 28, 1997) (Rel. Min. Carlos Velloso), 165 RTJ 173
(1998).
108. CONST. AMEND. No. 32 of Sept. 11, 2001, art. 1.
109. Id.
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provisional measure that lapses because of the passage of time is
no longer void ab initio. Instead, any legal relations constituted
under it must be regulated by legislative decree. If Congress fails
to act within 60 days of the invalidity of the provisional measure,
legal relations constituted under the provisional measure remain
in effect and are governed by the measure. 110
While substantially curbing presidential powers, Amendment
32 actually expanded presidential power in two respects. First, it
modified Article 246 of the Constitution to allow the use of the
provisional measure to regulate constitutional amendments
promulgated after January 1, 1995. Second, Amendment 32 au-
thorized the reissuance of rejected provisional measures in a sub-
sequent legislative session."1
Between September 11, 2001, when Amendment 32 was
adopted, and March 10, 2009, a total of 458 original provisional
measures have been issued; an annual average of 61. This figure
is substantially higher than in years prior to 2001, when the an-
nual average number of original provisional measures was only
about 47. The overwhelming majority of the post-2001 provisional
measures have had their life extended for an additional sixty days
and have ultimately been converted into laws. Only thirty (about
15.2%) have been rejected, and only ten (about 4.6%) have been
declared ineffective. 112
Since Amendment 32, the Brazilian courts have become much
less tolerant of executive abuse of the provisional measure. At-
tempts to reissue essentially the same provisional measure during
the same legislative session have been declared unconstitu-
tional.113 The courts are also more willing to examine the question
of whether there really is urgency and relevancy to justify resort
to the provisional measure. 1 4 The Supreme Court explained why
it was now more willing to review the president's reasons for issu-
ing provisional measures in the following separation of powers
terms:
110. This language, however, permits the Executive to reissue a rejected provisional
measure in another legislative session. MENDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 891.
111. Id.
112. Four were revoked by another provisional measure, one was vetoed, and three were
deemed prejudiced. As of March 10, 2009, thirteen are still in the process of consideration.
These figures have been obtained from the chart of all provisional measures that appears
at: www.planalto.gov.br/ccivilO3JMPV/Quadro/_Quadro%2OGeral.htm.
113. ADI-MC 3.964 (medida laminar) (STF en banc, Dec. 12, 2007) (Rel. Min. Carlos
Britto), Didrio de Justiia [Justice Journal], Apr. 11, 2008.
114. ADI-MC 2.213 (STF en banc, Apr. 4, 2002) (Rel. Min. Celso de Mello), Didrio de
Justi~a [Justice Journal], April 23, 2004.
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The growing institutional appropriation of the power to legis-
late by successive presidents has set off grave concerns to the
legal order. The excessive utilization of provisional measures
has caused profound distortions to political relations between
the Executive and Legislative Powers.
One cannot justify the abusive use of provisional measures.
Otherwise the Executive-absent constitutional reasons of
urgency, necessity and material relevance-illegitimately in-
vests itself with the most relevant institutional function that
belongs to the National Congress, converting itself ... into a
hegemony of power. This gravely prejudices the regime of
public liberties and has serious repercussions for the system
of "checks and balances." [... ]
It is up to the Judiciary, in the performance of its inherent
functions, to prevent the compulsive exercise of the extraordi-
nary power to issue provisional measures from culminating in
... a virtual governmental Caesarism. This has been causing
grave distortions to the political model and generating serious
dysfunctions, compromising the integrity of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. 115
Since Amendment 32, more legislation has been initiated by
Congress. A study of the 2005 legislative session found that
40.17% of the legislation enacted that year was initiated by Con-
gress-a substantial increase from prior years. 116  While this
means that the majority of the legislation still results from provi-
sional measures or draft bills presented by the executive, Con-
gress has become decidedly more active in initiating legislation.
C. Judicial Independence and Judicial Lawmaking
The second most important transference of power in the 1988
Constitution has been the augmentation of the powers of the judi-
ciary. Traditionally, judicial independence has been assured by
guarantees of life tenure and non-diminution of salaries. But life
tenure is a misnomer; Brazilian judges must retire at age 70.117
115. Id.
116. Ant6nio Augusto Queiroz, http:www2.camara.gov.br/camaraFaz/ultimas-
noticias/prodleg3lO8.html.
117. CONST. of 1988 arts. 93 (VI) & 40, § 1 (II); Organic Law of National Magistrates (Lei
Complementar No. 35 of Mar. 14, 1979), art. 74.
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Moreover, judges of the first instance, who are chosen by competi-
tive examinations, acquire tenure only after two years of ser-
vice. 118 Members of the Supreme Court may only be removed by
impeachment, while other judges may be removed only by convic-
tion before a competent court. 119 Since 2005, however, lower court
judges have been subject to disciplinary proceedings before the
National Judicial Council. 120 Article 99 of the 1988 Constitution
grants the judiciary substantial financial independence by author-
izing the tribunals to formulate their own budgets within the lim-
its imposed by the law of budgetary directives. Congress is not
formally obligated to fund those budgets, but, in practice, Con-
gress has in fact done so. Indeed, serious questions have been
raised about the judiciary's misuse of its functional financial
autonomy to pay themselves very high salaries and build luxuri-
ous courthouses.' 21
The 1988 Constitution creates a plethora of positive rights, such
as rights to health, employment, a minimum wage, and housing.
Suits by litigants to enforce these rights present serious separa-
tion of powers problems for the Brazilian courts. For example, if a
destitute person who needs a kidney transplant sues the govern-
ment to compel it to furnish a free transplant pursuant to Article
196-which guarantees the right to health-and the heading of
Article 5-which guarantees the right to life-should the courts
order the government to transplant a kidney to keep the plaintiff
alive? If they do so, are the courts usurping the powers of the
Ministry of Health in determining how Brazil's scarce health
funds should be allocated? If they order that this litigant and oth-
ers similarly situated receive the necessary medical care, does this
leave governmental agencies with insufficient funds to save the
lives or health of others? Despite these troubling separation of
powers problems, the Brazilian courts have been issuing decisions
ordering the government to provide necessary medical treat-
ment.1 22 Recently, the Supreme Court held three days of public
118. CONST. of 1988 art. 95 (1).
119. Id. arts. 52 (II), 95 (1).
120. Id. arts. 93 (VIII) & 103-B, § 4 (III).
121. Carlos Santiso, Economic Reform and Judicial Governance in Brazil: Balancing
Independence with Accountability, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE
ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 161, 172-73 (Siri Gloppen et
al. eds., 2004).
122. See, e.g., RE-Agr 271.286-8/RS (STF Second Chamber, Sept. 12, 2000) (Rel. Min.
Celso de Mello), Di~rio de Justi~a [Justice Journal], Nov. 24, 2000, and cases cited therein.
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hearings exploring costs and benefits of what has been character-
ized as the "excessive judicialization of the right to health."'123
The 1988 Constitution substantially enhances the Supreme
Court's powers to determine the constitutionality of legislation in
the abstract. The representation action created by the 1934 Con-
stitution was renamed the "direct action of unconstitutionality."
Whereas previously only the procurator general could bring this
action, the 1988 Constitution significantly expanded standing to
bring a direct action of unconstitutionality to include the presi-
dent, the executive committees of the Senate or Chamber of Depu-
ties, state governors, the federal council of the Brazilian Bar Asso-
ciation, any political party represented in Congress, and any na-
tional labor or business association.124 The Supreme Court has
eleven members and normally sits in panels of five. In a direct
action of unconstitutionality, however, at least eight members
must be present to decide the action. 125 Since an absolute majority
of any court or special organ is needed to declare a statute uncon-
stitutional, 26 at least six votes on the Supreme Court are needed
to declare a statute unconstitutional in a direct action of unconsti-
tutionality. 27
As a matter of separation of powers, the Supreme Court takes a
very restrictive view of its interpretative powers in direct actions,
characterizing its role as that of a "negative legislator."'128 The
Court refuses to interpret a statute in a way that would change its
meaning on the theory that to do so would be acting as a positive
legislator. On the other hand, the Supreme Court will declare a
statute constitutional only if interpreted in a particular manner. 29
The direct action of unconstitutionality is a useful device for po-
litical parties that have lost in the legislature to continue their
battle in the Supreme Court. The mere threat of such an action
may produce political negotiations to soften certain provisions,
123. Noticias STF, Apr. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.stf.js.br/porta/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=107102&tip=UN.
124. CONST. of 1988 art. 103 (I-X).
125. Law No. 9.868 of Nov. 10, 1999, art. 22.
126. CONST. of 1988 art. 97.
127. Law No. 9.868 of Nov. 10, 1999, arts. 22, 23.
128. ADI No. 896-DF (medida liminar) (STF en banc, Nov. 3, 1993) (vote of Rel. Moreira
Alva), 159 RTJ 111, 121 (1997).
129. ADI No. 491-AM (medida liminar) (STF en banc June 13, 1991) (vote of Rel.
Moreira Alves), 137 RTJ 90, 99-100 (1991); ADI No. 1.344 (medida liminar) (STF en banc
1995) (vote of Rel. Moreira Alves), 205 RDA 196, 200-201 (1996). The Brazilians refer to
this as "interpretation in conformity with the Constitution," the functional analogue to the
U.S. technique of interpreting a statute in a way that saves it from constitutional doubts.
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and the Supreme Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction con-
fers substantial political leverage to the party bringing the action.
The Supreme Court has not been overwhelmed with direct ac-
tions. According to the Supreme Court's statistics, a total of 4,207
direct actions have been filed before the Supreme Court between
1988 and March 2, 2009, but these statistics include each request
for preliminary injunctive relief as a separate action from the mer-
its. Putting aside requests for preliminary relief, only 3,740 direct
actions of unconstitutionality have been filed, an average of about
178 per year. Nearly all these actions have been brought by state
governors, unions, class entities, the federal procurator general, or
political parties. Only 2,758 of these direct actions of unconstitu-
tionality have ever been decided. Approximately 24.3% of these
actions have resulted in determinations that the challenged law or
act was unconstitutional, and another 6.3% resulted in a partial
determination of unconstitutionality. More than 63.3% were re-
jected on the merits, and another 6% were deemed improper. More
than one-fourth are still awaiting decision. 130
There are also three other forms of direct action before the Su-
preme Court. In 1993, Constitutional Amendment No. 3 created a
direct action of constitutionality to permit the Supreme Court to
hear "actions declaring the constitutionality of federal laws or
normative acts." The constitutionality of state or local legislation
cannot be determined under this action. Moreover, standing to
bring this action is limited to only the president, the procurator
general, or the executive committees of either house of Congress.
Decisions of the Supreme Court in a direct action of constitutional-
ity are also binding erga omnes. The constitutionality of the
amendment creating this action was promptly challenged by the
Association of Brazilian Magistrates on the ground that it violated
the principle of separation of powers by turning the Supreme
Court into a consultative organ of the legislature. Although this
action was dismissed on lack of standing grounds, the Supreme
Court in a divided vote sustained the constitutionality of the direct
action of constitutionality in a subsequent action. 131 The direct
action of constitutionality has been infrequently used. Between
1993 and March 2, 2009, only 17 such actions have been brought
(omitting five requests for preliminary injunctive relief). Only 13
actions have been finally decided. Just five have been successful,
130. These statistics appear at:
www.stf.jus.br/portallcms/verTexto.asp?servico=estastistica&pagina=adi
131. ADC No. 1, 157 RTJ 371 (STF en banc 1993) (Rel. Moreira Alves).
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and one was partly successful. Seven were rejected, and four are
awaiting judgment. 132
In 1999, Congress enacted a law that created a new direct ac-
tion called the "allegation of the violation of a fundamental pre-
cept."'133 Anyone with standing to bring a direct action of uncon-
stitutionality also has standing to bring an action for violation of a
fundamental precept directly before the Supreme Court, provided
there is no other effective remedy. An absolute majority of the
Supreme Court can issue a provisional remedy suspending pro-
ceedings in any case before the state or lower federal courts unless
the matter is res judicata. The Supreme Court may declare any
law or act unconstitutional with erga omnes effects. This action
has also seen little use. Between 1999 and March 2, 2009, only
163 actions for violation of a fundamental precept have been filed,
including 12 requests for preliminary injunctions. The Supreme
Court has resolved only 98 of these cases by final decision, and 53
are awaiting decision. Until April 2009, only two cases alleging
violation of a fundamental precept had been successful on the
merits. 134 On April 30, 2009, however, the Supreme Court utilized
the concept of violation a fundamental precept to issue a seminal
decision that invalidated in its entirety the restrictive Press Law,
which had been enacted by a military government in 1967.135
The 1988 Constitution also created an original action in the Su-
preme Court for unconstitutionality by omission. Having enacted
a programmatic constitution requiring a large amount of comple-
mentary legislation, the Brazilian Congress, when acting as the
Constituent Assembly, tried to deal with the likelihood that the
Congress would probably not enact such legislation for a long
time. Therefore, it enabled certain groups to bring an original ac-
tion directly before the Supreme Court "whenever there is a lack
of measures to make a constitutional rule effective."'136 If an ad-
ministrative agency has failed to act, the Supreme Court can di-
rect that needed measures be adopted within thirty days. If Con-
gress has failed to act, the Supreme Court can only issue a warn-
ing that legislation is needed. Principles of separation of powers
prevent the Court from issuing the missing legislation itself or
132. These statistics appear at:
www.stf.jus.br/portalcms/verTexto.asp?servico=estastistica&pagina=adc.
133. Law 9.882 of Dec. 3, 1999, enacted to regulate Art. 102 §1 of the 1988 Constitution..
134. These statistics appear at:
www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estastistica&pagina=adpf.
135. ADPF 130 (STF Apr. 30, 2009).
136. CONST. of 1988 arts. 102 (I)(a) & 103, § 2.
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from attempting to impose a sanction on the legislature for failing
to legislate. Not surprisingly, the action for unconstitutionality by
omission has been largely ineffective. Nevertheless, in one highly
controversial decision, the Supreme Court used the action for un-
constitutionality by omission to invalidate a provisional measure
because it had set the minimum wage below what was needed to
restore the purchasing power lost to inflation. 3 7
The 1988 Constitution created a similar remedy, called the
"mandate of injunction," which can be brought initially in the
state or lower federal courts whenever lack of regulatory provi-
sions make it impossible to exercise constitutional rights or liber-
ties, or the prerogatives of nationality, citizenship, or sover-
eignty. 138 The procedure for this constitutional remedy has yet to
be issued, but the Supreme Court has been permitting actions for
a mandate of injunction to utilize the procedure enacted for an-
other constitutional writ, the writ of security, created in the 1934
Constitution. 139 The mandate of injunction creates the same kinds
of separation of powers problems as the direct action for unconsti-
tutionality. Initially, the Supreme Court took the position that its
role in mandate of injunction cases was limited simply to declaring
the failure of the legislature to enact needed legislation. To grant
a remedy without the necessary legislation would be incompatible
with the principle of separation of powers. 140 Since 1991, however,
in certain types of cases in which the Constitution has itself cre-
ated the cause of action, the Supreme Court has tried to circum-
vent the separation of powers problem by setting a period of time
for the legislature to enact the necessary legislation; if the legisla-
tion has not been enacted within that period, the Supreme Court
has been creating a remedy by analogy, borrowing from an exist-
ing statute.14'
137. ADI No.1.458-DF (medida liminar) (STF en banc May 23, 1996) (Rel. Celso de
Mello), 162 RTJ 877 (1997).
138. CONST. of 1988 art. 5 (LXXI).
139. CONST. of 1934 art. 113 (33); CONST. of 1988 art. 5 (LXIX). The writ of security is
regulated by Law No. 1.533 of Dec. 31, 1951.
140. MI 107 (STF en banc Nov. 23, 1989) (Rel. Moreira Alves), 133 RTJ 11 (1990).
141. See, e..g., MI No. 355, 200 RDA 234 (STF en banc 1994) (Rel. Celso de Mello), where
the Supreme Court permitted plaintiffs in a mandate of injunction action to seek indemni-
fication from the government under existing legislation where Congress had failed to enact
legislation to implement a right guaranteed by the Constitution. See also MENDES ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 1210-21; Rodrigo Reis Mazzei, Mandado de Injunqdo, in ACOES
CONSTITUCIONAIS [CONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS] 211, 229-32 (Fredie Didier Jr. ed., 3d ed.
2008). The Supreme Court has declared the legislature in default in 12 cases, three of
which date back as far as 1992, but Congress has still not enacted the necessary legislation.
The cases may be retrieved from: http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/principal/principal.asp.
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Constitutional Amendment No. 45 of December 2004 instituted
substantial reforms in the Brazilian judiciary. One of its principal
innovations was the creation of a National Judicial Council to su-
pervise and discipline members of the Judiciary below the rank of
members of the Supreme Court, and to aid in preparing the
budget requests of the courts. The constitutionality of this consti-
tutional amendment was challenged in a direct action of unconsti-
tutionality by the Association of Brazilian Magistrates, which con-
tended that the National Judicial Council interfered with the in-
dependence of the judiciary, thereby violating the non-amendable
principle of separation of powers. The Association also contended
that the amendment violated the principles of federalism by
granting supervisory powers over state judges to a federal organ.
A majority of the Supreme Court rejected these challenges, apply-
ing a flexible functionalist approach to separation of powers and
federalism. The vote of the Rapporteur, Cezar Peluso, after citing
the works of historical authors from Aristotle, Montesquieu, and
Locke, ultimately relied upon Justice Jackson's celebrated concur-
ring opinion in the Steel Seizure case for the proposition:
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure lib-
erty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dis-
persed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity. 142
Because the Council only affected administrative functions of
the courts rather than its case-deciding functions, the Supreme
Court refused to declare the amendment creating it unconstitu-
tional for violation of the non-amendable principle of separation of
powers. It also rejected a federalism challenge because the Con-
stitution had organized the judiciary on a national basis. 143
In a direct declaratory action of constitutionality, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a 2005 resolution of the Na-
tional Judicial Council banning both judicial nepotism and cross
nepotism (where judges hire each other's relatives) up to the third
degree of kinship. The Supreme Court sustained this resolution
on the theory that, regardless of the existence of a specific norm
authorizing the resolution, nepotism is inconsistent with the head-
142. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
143. ADI No. 3.367-DF (STF en banc Apr. 13, 2005) (Rel. Cezar Peluso), Di~rio Oficial
[Federal Register], Mar. 17, 2006.
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ing of Article 37 of the Constitution, which requires that Public
Administration comply with the principles of morality and imper-
sonality.1 44 Two years later, the Supreme Court decided an ex-
traordinary appeal in which the Tribunal of Justice of the State of
Rio Grande do Norte had found nothing illegal or unconstitutional
about the state's employing relatives of government officials and
had found the National Judicial Council's 2005 resolution inappli-
cable to state executive and legislative bureaucracies. The Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that Article 37 of the Constitution
mandates extension of the ban on nepotism imposed upon the ju-
diciary by the National Judicial Council to the executive and legis-
lative branches of the federal, state, and municipal govern-
ments. 145 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court converted this
holding into Sdmula Vinculante No. 13, making it a precedent
binding erga omnes. Some members of the other branches of gov-
ernment have been unhappy about this attempt to improve Brazil-
ian public administration by judicial legislation, and the Brazilian
press has been reporting widespread circumvention of the Su-
preme Court's decision in the Federal Senate and certain state
and local governments. 146
Amendment 45 also authorized the Supreme Court to issue
binding precedents upon constitutional matters by vote of eight
ministers. To jurists trained in the civil law tradition, giving this
power to the Supreme Court creates separation of powers issues
by allowing judicial legislation; therefore, a constitutional
amendment was required. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did
not begin to issue binding precedents until May 30, 2007, waiting
for the Legislature to enact a statute implementing the proce-
dure. 147 As of September 1, 2009, the Supreme Court has issued
only 16 binding precedents. 148 These precedents are all single sen-
tence black letter rules of law that float freely from the facts of the
cases upon which they were laid down. Whenever a decision of a
lower court or administrative body fails to follow a binding prece-
144. ADC 12-DF (medida liminar) (STF en banc Feb. 16, 2006) (Rel. Min. Carlos Britto),
199 RTJ 427 (2007).
145. RE 579.951-4 Rio Grande do Norte (STF en banc Aug. 20, 2008) (Rel. Ricardo
Lewandowski).
146. See, e.g., Senado ignora decisdo do STF e mantgm nepotismo [Senate Ignores Deci-
sion of the STF and Keeps Nepotism], FOLHA ONLINE, July 8, 2009; Combate ao nepotismo
fracassa [Fight Against Nepotism Fails], GAZETTA DO POVO [GAZETTE OF THE PEOPLE], Aug.
24, 2009.
147. Law No. 11.417 of Dec. 19, 2006.
148. See http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/principal/principal.asp.
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dent, a party may complain directly to the Supreme Court, which
has the power to quash an inconsistent judicial or administrative
decision and to order that a new consistent decision be issued. 149
The expansion of abstract judicial review and the creation of the
binding precedents have led the Supreme Court to treat even its
nonbinding decisions as though they are binding on the lower
courts. 150 This expansion has also made the Senate's shared role
in judicial review by issuing resolutions to revoke laws declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court increasingly anachronis-
tic. If the Supreme Court decides that a statute is unconstitu-
tional in a direct action, the President of the Supreme Court does
not refer the statute to the Senate for suspension. 15' This is be-
cause the Supreme Court's decision is already binding erga omnes.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Brazil has a well-developed doctrine of separation of powers and
checks and balances that are peculiarly Brazilian. From time to
time, it has replaced the traditional tripartite division with a
fourth power, the moderating power, which harks back to its ini-
tial Constitution of 1824. Like most Latin American countries,
Brazilian constitutions have conferred substantial legislative pow-
ers upon the president. They have done so in large part because of
a deep-seated conviction that governability requires that the ex-
ecutive must have the power to legislate in certain circumstances.
Unfortunately, the primary vehicle for executive legislation, the
provisional measure, has been seriously abused by Brazilian
Presidents.
The changes made by the 1988 Constitution have thrust the ju-
diciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, into a major political
and policymaking role. On numerous occasions, the Supreme
Court has struck down important legislation because of perceived
constitutional violations. 152 Moreover, the numerous direct ac-
tions in which the Supreme Court must determine constitutional-
ity as an original matter and in the abstract leave the Supreme
Court with little room to avoid politically charged controversies by
149. Law No. 11.417 of Dec. 19, 2006, art. 7.
150. C16merson Merlin Cl~ve, Agdo Direta de Inconstitucionalidade [Direct Action of
Unconstitutionality], 45 REV. INFORM. LEGIS. 141-42 & n.3 (No. 179, July/Sept. 2008); MEN-
DES ETAL., supra note 29, at 1084; Mendes, supra note 24, at 272-73.
151. Mendes, supra note 24, at 265.
152. See generally MATTHEW M. TAYLOR, JUDGING POLICY: COURTS AND POLICY REFORM
IN DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL (2008).
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refusing to hear them. The broad constitutional grants of stand-
ing to a variety of political and civic actors with their own agen-
das, coupled with broad constitutional grants of jurisdiction, mean
that political controversies are more frequently presented to the
Court than if one had to depend upon the vagaries of the normal
litigation process. As a result, the Supreme Court has been con-
stantly in the "political thicket." For example, the Supreme Court
has had to decide the following politically charged types of cases:
(1) whether a president convicted by the Senate after being im-
peached by the Chamber of Deputies for corruption is guilty or
innocent of criminal charges, (2) whether a senator should be de-
prived of his political mandate, (3) whether index clauses in collec-
tive bargaining contracts should be suspended, (4) whether social
security reform should be suspended, or (5) whether wage hikes
should be granted to civil servants. 153 The Supreme Court has
also declared a large number of federal, state, and municipal stat-
utes unconstitutional.
One consequence of this judicial activism has been demands for
greater accountability and more rapid performance from the judi-
ciary. After many years of debate, Congress ultimately adopted
Constitutional Amendment 45 on December 8, 2004, resulting in a
major reform of the judiciary. This amendment created the Na-
tional Judicial Council to establish external control over the finan-
cial and administrative functions of the judiciary, and to supervise
and discipline lower court judges and their staffs. It also grants
everyone the constitutional right, albeit precatory, to have all ju-
dicial and administrative proceedings end within a reasonable
time. To try to make this right a reality, Amendment 45 makes
judicial performance and productivity criteria for promotions and
also makes it easier to eliminate bad judges. It requires courts to
be open continually and prohibits collective vacations by appellate
courts. It also requires persons filing extraordinary appeals to the
Supreme Court show that the constitutional issues in their cases
have "general repercussions"-a measure that has substantially
reduced the huge caseload of the Supreme Court.154
153. See Marcos Faro de Castro, supra note 72.
154. During the first year of Gilmar Mendes's presidency, which began in April 2008, the
number of new cases in Supreme Court declined from 97,435 to 56,537, a drop of 40.9%. A
large part of this drop in caseload is attributable to the general repercussion requirement,
which enabled the Supreme Court to discard more than 31,000 extraordinary appeals.
Noticias STF, Apr. 20, 2009, available at
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/geral/verImpressao.asp. Law 11.418 of December 19, 2006,
which added Articles 543A and B to the Code of Civil Procedure to implement this part of
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The Brazilian concept of the separation of powers is constantly
evolving. It is a flexible principle that requires respect for the in-
dependence of the core functions of each of the other branches,
but, at the same time, permits each branch to exercise the func-
tion of checking the other branches. Since Constitutional
Amendment 32 of 2001, which substantially curbed the executive's
usurpation of much of the legislative power by abuse of the provi-
sional measure, the traditional principle of separation of powers
has been restored once more to constitutional health in Brazil.
the Amendment, makes any decision denying the existence of general repercussions bind-
ing with respect to all other appeals presenting the same issues.
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